Psychoanalysis: Science or Fiction? Emanuel E. Garcia
The completion of this paper comes coincidentally at a tim e wh e n a book b y a scholarly philosopher, Adolf Grunbaum, entitled Th e Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, has just been published and purpo rts to answer th e question of the scientific status of analysis. This temporall y fo llows Jeffre y Masson 's work ( 1) whi ch ac cuses Freud of abandoning th e so-ca lled seduction h ypothesis and by so doing laying unsound groundwork for th e "science" that consumes Freud's nearly lim itless energies . In short, it is a period in wh ich psychoanalysis fin ds itself condemned, but perhaps in a mo re veheme n t and visible fashion than usual.
To be sure , ps ychoanalysis has always had to bear th e b runt of vociferous hostilit y, which incidentally did not trouble Freud, gi ven hi s understa nd ing of the nature of the resistance to the revelations of analysis. Sin ce those head y d ays in the early 19 50 's wh en analysis e nj oyed an unequalled popularity, pa rticula rl y in America, a rather shocking phenomenon has arisen . It seems that a fair number of analysts nowadays, in contradiction to Freud's most earnestly held belief, have relinquish ed the claim that psychoanalysis is a science. If th is is true, if analysis ind eed has no scientific base or m ethodology, ve r y little remains to warrant serious consideration . At best it becomes merel y one of th e ma ny forms of psychotherapy, useful for a rather limited range of th e mental di so rd e rs and accessible to a very small percentage of the population , i.e. , th ose who have the resources and willingness to engage in th e laborious and often pain ful process of confronting the extraordinar ily powerful and nearly intractable fo rces of the unco nscious. Ifpsychoanalysis is noth ing more than this, if th e therapy, as Freud feared, destroys the science, then it remains but an admirable od d ity even to the most forgiv ing and optimisti c of its enthusiasts. In this pe rsp ective the following comments by the narrator of Marie Cardinal's Th e Word s to Say It are full y j ustified:
Freud was the puppeteer! They were his thi ck st r in gs o perati ng t he little doctor. He was the priest o f ps ychoanal ysis, that reli gio n in which a certain pompous, vainglorious and male volent intell ect ual elite reveled (2).
T he re you have it: a religion , all powder and smoke, hocus-pocu s, illusio n , everything that Freud sought to avoid in his scrup ulo us undertakin g. The
Emanuel Garcia is a fourth -year medical student at the University of Penn sylvania. He will enter a psychiatry residency in J uly. It is not permissible to declare that science is one field o f huma n mental activity and that religion and philosophy are others, at least its equa l in value, and that science has no business to interfere wit h the other two; that they all have an equal claim to be true and th at everyone is at liberty to choose from which he will draw hi s co nvictions and in which he will place his belief. A view of this kind is regarded as particularly superior, tolerant, broad-minded and free from illiberal prejudices. Unfortunately it is not tenable.. .It is sim p ly a fact that the truth cannot be tolerant, that it admits of no compromises or limitations, that research regards every sphere of human activity as belonging to it and that it must be relentlessl y critical if a ny other power tries to take over any part of it (3).
So much for Freud's opinion of illusion. But what does he really m ean when he refers to psychoanalysis as a science, when he says " Psych oa na lysis bega n as a method of therapy, but I did not want to commend it to yo ur in te rest as a method of therapy but on account of the truths it contains, o n accou nt of the information it gives us about what concerns human beings mo st o f all-their own nature" (4)?
First, as implied above, Freud gave no credence to what he te r med the anarchistic view that there is no such thing as truth , no ass ured kn o wledge of the external world, that "What we give out as being scien t ific truth is only the product of our own needs as they are bound to find utterance unde r changing external conditions" (5) . While acknowledging the intellectual a ppeal of such arguments (perhaps similar to that exe r ted b y Xeno's paradoxes) he deftly notes their demise in the fac e of practical exige nc ies , as in th e d eci sion to ad minister one-tenth of a gram or ten grams of morphine to a patient.
Freud saw scientific pursuit as generall y slo w and laborious, like n ing progress in scientific work to that in analysis.
We bring expectations with us into th e work, but they must be forcibly held back. By observation, now at one point, and now at another, we come upon something new; but to begin with the pieces do not fit together. We put forward conjectures, we construct hypotheses, which we withdraw if they are not confirmed, we need much patience and readiness for any eventuality, we renounce early convictions so as not to be led by them into overlooking unexpected factors .. .In psychoanalysis, however, we have to do without th e assistance offered to research by experiment (6) . This, by the way, the " p uppeteer " ! Freud compared Science to a sculptor modeling cla y (6) , co ntin ually refining, revising, adding and su b tract in g until that criterion o f tr uth-correspondence to th e external world, or to foll ow th e a r tist's metaphor, the "mirror up to nature"-is ach ieved. This metaphor, whi ch lin ks the two pillars o f civilizatio n, Science and Art, is cha racte r istic o f Freud, who often claimed that analysis merely syste matized wh at great art ists such as Shakespeare a nd Goethe had been providing us all along, namel y, insights into h u ma n natu re . " T he only subject matter of psychoanalysis is th e men tal processes of human beings and it is only in humans that it can be stu d ied" (7) .
As to the position of psychoanal ysis with in th e sciences, Freud had th is to sa y:
Psychoanalysis is not a sp ecialized branch o f medicin e . . . b u t simpl y of psychology. It is certainly not th e whole of psych olo gy, b u t its substructure and perhaps ev e n its entire foundation (8) .
In response to th e co ntem p tuo us criticism that ps ychoan al ysis is impossible to consider seriously as a science, being an undertaking wh o se most general concepts are as lacking in preci sion as libido and instinct, Freud po in ts out that:
This reproach rests on a co m p le te mi sconception of th e facts. Clear basic concepts and sha r p ly drawn definitions are onl y possibl e in th e mental scie nces insofar as th e latter seek to fit a reg io n of facts into the frame of a logical system. In th e natural sciences, of whi ch psychology is one , suc h co ncep ts are super fluous an d indeed im possible. Zoology and botany did not sta r t fro m correct and adequate definitions of a n animal a nd a pl ant; to thi s ve ry d a y biolo gy has been unable to gi ve any ce r ta in meaning to th e co ncept of life . P h ysics itself, indeed, wo uld never have made any advan ce if it had had to wait until its concepts of matter, force a nd grav itation , and so on , had reached the d esirable degree of clarity and precisio n (9).
In summary, Freud firml y a nd unhesitatingl y placed ps ychoanalysis amid the other sciences, shar ing with them th e pursuit of truth a nd th e general weltanschauung. By creating h ypotheses to fit th e o bser ved d at a , b y continually being open to new data warranting a revision or even th e wholesale demolit ion of such hypotheses, th e investigation of th e "mental processes of human beings," a wide and rich domain that includes every sp he re o f huma n acti vit y would humbly proceed. That the conditions for conducting this investiga tion ca lled for the practicing of th e therapy is a distinguishing feature of psychoa nalysis, but one that in no way diminishes its scie ntific status .
But let us pause to clarify our own ideas of what co ns titu tes a scie n tific enterprise and what does not. Science, as etymologicall y implied, seeks to know; it seeks the truth about the world-including th e inner nature of ma n-a nd attempts systematically to account for natural phenomena . Fo r so me scie nces the task is made easier b y th e a bility to isolate variables a nd run experiments. The ta sk is less clear-cut for o t he rs, which o ften suffe r th e taint of bein g condemned as unscientific, probably owing to the fac t that toda y most concei ve of science as a pure realm of immutable facts, precise experiments an d doubleblinded, randomized, placebo-controlled studies. This latter view is a gross misconception that deserves to be placed alongside those narrow attempts of sociologists and philosophers to establish firm criteria for scien tificity th at betoken very little understanding of their subject.
To return to the matter of whether psychoanalysis deserves to be ca lled a science, I will draw heavily from a remarkably lucid paper by Robert Waelde r (10). First, Waelder distinguishes various self-explanatory levels of th e psych oa nal ytic process: observation; clinical interpretation; clinical generali zatio n ; clinical theory; metapsychology; and finall y, Freud's philosoph y. T he last two a re regarded as being far less important than the others. Of th e metapsych olog ica l hypotheses, Freud himself said that they "are not the bottom but th e top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded with out damagin g it "
(11 ).
Outsiders, and 1 include the sociologist and philosopher among t hem , generally have no idea of what analytic data are. Never having undergone an analysis nor having pursued the rigorous training that would gi ve t hem an opportunity to acquire data as an analyst , they remain necessaril y unin fo rmed . In a sense, the anal yst's unique method of gathering data, th e ana lytic sessionthat special circumstance that constitutes the wellspring of materia l on which psychoanalysis bases its findings, can be lik ened to mi croscopy. Just as th e ignoranti who have never so much as seen a microscope co n dem ned and ridiculed Leuwenhoek's descriptions of the marvelous organism s and str uc tu res he espied, so do similarly disposed individuals manufacture diatribes aga inst analysis. The technique of free association-and this cannot be ov eremphasized-makes the analyst privy to a whole world of data unmet within ordina r y circumstances, and generally inaccessible. Criticisms of psychoanalysis that pay no heed to this fact cannot be taken seriously.
Waelder (10) examines the so-ca lled exact sciences, suc h as che m ist ry and ph ysics (one should bear in mind that he himself had been a ph ysicist before an analyst) and gleans four prerequisites for their exactitude:
1. Events must be contemporary, able to be repeated over and over, like the movements of the stars, or at will. 2. Variables must be loosely coupled so that it becomes possible to isolate the effect of one. When they are coupled closely, evidence fo r ca use a nd effect becomes difficult to ascertain, for when one va r ia ble changes, by definition the others change simultaneously. 3. The su bj ect under investigation must not change significantly dur ing th e course of the investigation , otherwise new unknowns are introduced. 4. The subjects under study must be sufficiently small so t hat wh at happens to individual units, e.g., a single electron, has little importance , sin ce only the aggregate matters, thus rendering statistical management adequate and appropriate.
Psychoanalysis obviously meets none o f th e above. It s subject-Man-is a complex composite of closely co u pled va r ia b les , as indeed every organism is, which changes constantly and does not lend itself to statistical treatment in a ny meaningful way. It su rely is an implicit and neces sary virtue of a na lysis that the behavior of an indi vidual unit, unlike the e lec tro ns in Boh r 's model of the h ydrogen atom, is of th e utmost significance ; indeed, o ne can measure the progress of civiliza t io n b y its increasing regard fo r t he individual. Note, however, that neither th e biol ogical nor social scie nces meet these cr iteria . Evolution , certainly co ns ide red o ne of th e most importa n t scientific advances in th e world's history, has ve ry little " di rect" evi dence in its support. Its appeal lies in th e fact th at a ny other proposed interpretation o f t he data with which it co ncerns itself is far less satisfactory. Our beli ef th at Co lum bus arrived in Am erica in 1492 is sim ila r ly founded, to Waelder's exam p le (10) . The existing evidence is indirect and circumstantial , consisting of letters, scattered reports, and th e like. No present day Methuselah can testi fy to h is setting foot on sh ore, but this reconstruction of e ve nts fits suc h a ma ss o f d ata fro m so man y varied sources that the probability of co inc id e nce is infinitesim al. O r to quote Stephen Jay Gould, " We kn o w that the su n is hub to o u r lit tle co rner of the universe, a nd th at ties of ge nealogy co n nect a ll livin g thi ngs o n o ur planet, because th ese th eories asse m b le and ex p lain so much o t herwise disparate and unrelated information . . ." ( 12) .
T h us psych oan al ysis. Concepts t hat have evolved from t he enormous mass of data derived from the anal yti c setting sim ply prese nt th e best fit.
With respect to Karl Popper's co nten tio n th at an al yti c theories are not "falsifiable ," it sh o uld be noted that through out th e hi story of psych oa na lysis theori es have continually been proposed, re vised, and rej ected , a ll in accordance with th e scie n t ific method that requires a n honest accounting of the observed phenomena. T o cite a specific e xa m p le o f th e fa lsifiabi lit y of anal ytic theories, repression as th e sine qua non of neuro sis co u ld be d isproved simply by the presentation o f a case in whi ch all in ner co nflic ts h ave never ceased to be full y ac cessibl e to co nsc io us ness and no repression of a ny aspect of them can be d etected, to paraphrase Waelder ( 10) o nce aga in .
Eve n tually it seems th at psych oanalyti c th eory mi gh t be confirmed o r in validat ed b y th e so rt of direct, exper imen ta l ev idence we associate with t he "exact" sciences. However, a ttem p ts of this kind would r equi re an exquisite mastery of anal ytic co nc e p ts as well as uncommon in ge nuity to earn validity th emsel ves. Until th en we ma y be co nten t to say of th e method of psychoanal ysis, like th at o f Zadig , "No t h ing ca n be mor e hopel essly vu lgar, mo re unlike t he maj esti c d evelopment of a syst em of g randly unintelli gible conclusions fr om su blimely in concei vable premises suc h as del ights t he magia n hea r t" ( 13) . And it may be th at p recisel y in its " vu lgar" p reo ccu pation with the truth about man 's dark impulses, in its ruthless di sa vo wal o f th e fict ions pe r pet rated b y personal o r organi zed religions, a na lysis has incited th e heated but u n fou nd ed accusations that it is not trul y a science . That members of t he anal ytic profession should
